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ENFORCING BROWN IN THE LITTLE ROCK CRISIS
Tony A. Freyer*
In modem America no issue revealed more explicitly the
compromise of aspirations than the desegregation of public
schools. The Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education
declared as a fundamental value "separate educational facilities
are inherently unequal." 1 A year later in Brown II the Court
based its decision on the likelihood of resistance, holding that
the implementation of educational equality should proceed "with
all deliberate speed,",2 and so acknowledged that the idea of
educational equality was a relative truth.3 In the twentieth
century no instance of opposition to that constitutional principle
4
was more significant than the Little Rock desegregation crisis.

* University Research Professor of History and Law, University of Alabama. For essential
assistance I am grateful to Marjorie F. Freyer and, for continuing support, Dean Kenneth C.
Randall, The University of Alabama Law School Foundation, and the Edward Brett
Randolph Fund. I thank, too, Joel E. Anderson, Chancellor of the University of Arkansas at
Little Rock, for giving me a copy of the report cited below.
1. Brown v. Bd of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (declaring government-sanctioned
segregation unlawful in schools operated by states); see also Boiling v. Sharp 347 U. S.
497 (1954) (declaring government-sanctioned segregation unlawful in schools operated by
District of Columbia).
2. Brown v. Bd ofEduc., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
3. On the decisional process, context, and long-term impact of Brown, see Richard
Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America's
Strugglefor Equality (Vintage 1977); James T. Patterson, Brown v. Board of Education: A
Civil Rights Milestone and Its Troubled Legacy (Oxford U. Press 2001); Mark V. Tushnet,
Making Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme Court, 1936-1961 (Oxford
U. Press 1994); Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation:Decisionmaking in
the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 Geo. L.J. 1 (1979); and Michael J. Klarman, Brown,
Racial Change,and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 Va. L. Rev. 7 (1994).
4. Concerning the Little Rock crisis and its continuing place in American history, see
Tony Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis: A ConstitutionalInterpretation (Greenwood Press
1984) [hereinafter Freyer, Little Rock Crisis]; Understanding the Little Rock Crisis: An
Exercise in Remembrance and Reconciliation(Elizabeth Jacoway & C. Fred Williams eds.,
U. Ark. Press 1999); Juan Williams, Eyes on the Prize: America's Civil Rights Years,
1954-1965 at 91-119 (Viking Penguin 1987); Tony Badger, "The Forerunner of Our
Opposition": Arkansas and the Southern Manifesto of 1956, 56 Ark. Historical Q. 353
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On September 3, 1957, Governor Orval E. Faubus claimed
that civil disorder threatened to erupt, and in defiance of federal
authority ordered the state's National Guard to block
desegregation of Central High School. For three weeks, Faubus,
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the local school board, the
local black community, the NAACP, and the federal judiciary
were embroiled in intractable confrontation. When on
September 20 the federal court found that his assertions
concerning disorder were unsubstantiated, Faubus complied
with the order to withdraw the Guard. However, after nine black
young people entered the school on September 23, a few rabblerousers galvanized the crowd outside Central, forcing their
withdrawal. The next day President Eisenhower dispatched
combat-ready paratroopers to the city and federalized the
Arkansas National Guard in order to enforce the court's
desegregation mandate. Although troops remained at Central
High until the academic year ended, a small group of
segregationist-supported youths harassed the nine black students
relentlessly.5
Tension again mounted during the summer of 1958. Faubus
sought a nearly unprecedented third-term gubernatorial
nomination, and the United States Supreme Court in a special
August term considered whether Arkansas authorities had
violated the Constitution during the fall confrontation. The
governor won a landslide victory, and the Court decided against
Arkansas public officials in Cooper v. Aaron.6 In the wake of
these events, the city's high schools were closed. Not until local
white moderates, informally aided by blacks, mobilized support

(1997); D.L. Chappell, Editor's Introduction, 56 Ark. Historical Q. ix (1997); Adam
Fairclough, The Little Rock Crisis: Success or Failurefor the NAACP? 56 Ark. Historical
Q. 371 (1997); Tony A. Freyer, The Little Rock CrisisReconsidered, 56 Ark. Historical Q.
361 (1997) [hereinafter Freyer, Little Rock Reconsidered]; John A. Kirk, The Little Rock
Crisis and PostwarBlack Activism In Arkansas, 56 Ark. Historical Q. 273 (1997); C. Fred
Williams, Class: The Central Issue in the 1957 Little Rock School Crisis, 56 Ark.
Historical Q. 341 (1997).
5. Unless otherwise noted, the historical material in this discussion is drawn from
Freyer, Little Rock Crisis, supra n. 4, although that text will be cited occasionally for
emphasis.
6. 358 U. S. 1 (1958).
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for a special school board election in the spring of 1959 did the
crisis finally end.7
From 1954 to 1959, segregationists appealed to white
supremacy, states' rights, and class consciousness in their
opposition to desegregation; integrationists advocated the
constitutional value of equal opportunity and interracial
brotherhood in their support of it. Both groups held to these
views as a matter of absolute principle. 8 By contrast, school
officials, state and federal authorities, and for some time Faubus
too, supported desegregation, primarily out of deference to the
Constitution as expounded by the Supreme Court. President
Eisenhower used this justification when he ordered the
paratroopers of the 101 Airborne to Little Rock: "Our personal
opinions about the [Brown] decision have no bearing on the
matter of enforcement," he said. 9 The moderates who won the
school board election that ended the confrontation in the spring
of 1959 were even more explicit. The Supreme Court's Brown
decision, the moderates exclaimed, "however much we dislike
it, is the declared law and is binding upon us. We think that the
decision was erroneous and that it was a reversal of established
law upon an unprecedented basis of psychology and sociology."
But, they continued, "we must in honesty recognize that,
because the Supreme Court is the court of last resort in this
country, what it has said must stand until there is a correcting
constitutional
amendment or until the Court corrects its own
' 10
error."
7. See Tony Freyer, Cooper v. Aaron, in The Oxford Companion to the Supreme
Court of the United States 197 (Kermit L. Hall ed., Oxford U. Press 1992); Hutchinson,
supra n. 4, at 73-86.
8. For the values and interests of the black community, the segregationists, state and
federal government officials, and white moderates, see Freyer, Little Rock Crisis, supra n.
4; Badger, supra n. 4; Freyer, Little Rock Reconsidered,supra n. 4; Fairclough, supra n. 4;
Kirk, supra n. 4; and C. Fred Williams, supran. 4.
9. Robert A. Burt, ConstitutionalLaw and the Teaching of the Parables,93 Yale L.J.
455, 475 (1984) (quoting radio-television address of Sept. 24, 1957, by President
Eisenhower); see also Michal R. Belknap, Federal Law and Southern Order: Racial
Violence and Constitutional Conflict in the Post-Brown South 27-52 (U. Ga. Press 1987);
Freyer, Little Rock Reconsidered,supra n. 4.
10. Henry M. Alexander, The Little Rock Recall Election, 17 Eagleton Inst. Cases in
Prac. Pol. 10 (McGraw-Hill 1960). For more on the moderates, see Badger, supra n. 4;
Freyer, Little Rock Reconsidered, supra n. 4; Allison Graham, Remapping Dogpatch:
Northern Media on the Southern Circuit, 56 Ark. Historical Q. 334 (1997); Elizabeth
Jacoway, Down from the Pedestal: Gender and Regional Culture in a Ladylike Assault on
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Following the decision of Brown I, school board
superintendent Virgil Blossom envisioned a program of
substantial integration, but by the announcement of Brown II in
1955 major revisions had occurred. As finally publicized, the
Blossom Plan required only token desegregation of one high
school (Little Rock Central) in 1957; similarly limited
desegregation would gradually take place in several phases
throughout the rest of the system over an unspecified number of
years. The "Phase Program" was flawed in several ways. Many
black children would be required to walk or be bused miles past
white schools to designated segregated ones. Although several
of the black schools were new, the academic content of their
curricula was inferior to that in the white schools. Ominously,
Central was located in a working-class white neighborhood,
which meant that many of those least receptive to racial
cooperation would first confront desegregation. The school
board gave as the fundamental rationale for its program the
reluctant but determined commitment to follow the Supreme
Court's 1954 opinion as the "law of the land."'"
Between 1955 and early 1957 desegregation clashes in
Hoxie, Arkansas (where integration ultimately prevailed), 12 and
elsewhere pressured Faubus to tilt toward the segregationists.
Meanwhile, even as the federal courts upheld the Blossom Plan
over a challenge from black parents represented by the local
NAACP branch's lawyer, Wiley Branton, 13 the board
experienced the intensity of the segregationist campaign during
a school board election in the spring of 1957.
Surreptitiously, the school board urged the Justice
Department to intervene. Department officials declined, but
these initiatives prompted a federal judge to make a remarkable

the Southern Way of Life 56 Ark. Historical Q. 345 (1997); Mark Newman, The Arkansas
Baptist State Convention and Desegregation, 1954-1968, 56 Ark. Historical Q. 294 (1997).
11. Tony A. Freyer, Objectivity and Involvement: Georg G. Iggers and Writing the
History of the Little Rock School Crisis, in Crossing Boundaries: The Exclusion and
Inclusion of Minorities in Germany and America 172, 180-88 (Larry Eugene Jones, ed.,
Berghahn Books 2001); C. Fred Williams, supra n. 4.
12. See Hoxie Sch. Dist. v. Brewer, 137 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Ark. 1956), aff'd; 238 F.2d
91 (8th Cir. 1956); Hoxie Sch. Dist. v. Brewer, 135 F. Supp. 296 (E.D. Ark. 1955)
(granting temporary restraining order).
13. Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. Ark. 1956), aff'd 243 F.2d 361 (8th Cir.
1957).
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suggestion. Judge John E. Miller, who had decided for the
school board in the desegregation suit, privately offered to delay
the desegregation of Central temporarily at the school board's
request. Eventually board members decided against such action,
but not before they had informally discussed the matter with
Faubus or his lawyer, William J. Smith. As the political heat on
the governor mounted, he quietly initiated a suit in state court in
August 1957 to request a stay in the desegregation of Central. At
the trial Faubus testified that he believed disorder was imminent;
Blossom, however, claimed that he did not share the governor's
concern. Blossom's testimony presented a public image that was
inconsistent with the board's private activities during the
summer. The state court granted the delay, which the federal
court immediately overruled. Faubus ordered the National Guard
to Central, setting off a confrontation with the federal court.14
The board then asked the federal tribunal to postpone the
desegregation of Central temporarily. School officials covertly
requested the aid of U.S. Marshals while they publicly remained
committed to the position that Superintendent Blossom had
taken during the state trial. At no time did the Little Rock school
board initiate litigation-as had Hoxie school officials-to
enjoin Faubus or others from interference with the Phase
Program. The refusal to take responsibility for the enforcement
of desegregation continued after the paratroopers established
order and in spite of unremitting harassment of the nine black
students by segregationist sympathizers in Central. Ultimately,
in the spring and summer of 1958, the board filed the Cooper v.
Aaron suit, which sought a two and one-half year stay, rather
than implementation, of desegregation. Coinciding with
Faubus's reelection bid, this suit led to the yearlong closure of
the city's high schools.' 5 The school board's appeal to
constitutional values without a corresponding willingness to
enforce those values thus constituted a strategy of failure.
14. The evidence supporting these statements includes previously unavailable reports
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, manuscript material from the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund, private files, and interviews with participants. See Freyer, Little Rock Crisis,
supra n. 4, at 98-109; 112 nn. 51-56; 113 nn. 57-66; 114 nn. 67-84 (describing then-secret
negotiations, state-court proceedings, and response of federal courts, and providing
citations to FBI reports, NAACP memoranda, private files, interview notes, and published
works); see also Thomason v. Cooper, 254 F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1958).
15. Cooper, 358 U. S. 1; see also n. 4, supra.
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The federal government approached desegregation in Little
Rock cautiously. Undoubtedly influenced by the Eisenhower
administration's "southern strategy," which sought to win
northern black voter support while at the same time appealing to
conservative Democrats, federal officials privately explained to
the city's school representatives that they would act in
desegregation litigation only upon a formal request from local
authorities or the federal court. Shortly before Central High
School was scheduled to open in compliance with the Blossom
Plan, Faubus privately discussed federal intervention with a
Justice Department official and was told the same thing.
In addition, the southern desegregation struggle was central
to the Cold War propaganda battle between the United States
and communist governments. Even so, the Eisenhower
administration's primary foreign policy concern was
strengthening the country's democratic image among African,
Asian, and Latin American nations; the intrinsic justice of
furthering the cause ofpublic school desegregation itself was of
secondary importance.
Nevertheless, in part responding to appeals from federal
judge Ronald N. Davies-a Republican who was temporarily
assigned to Little Rock from North Dakota-Attorney General
Herbert Brownell quietly authorized an FBI investigation.
Davies received a thoroughly documented 400-page report
indicating that Faubus's claims about violence were essentially
groundless. Meanwhile, the Justice Department tried without
success to persuade Branton to withdraw the desegregation suit.
Federal inaction and miscalculation encouraged defiance. In the
September 20 trial involving the governor, the Justice
Department did not introduce the FBI report. The Department
failed to do so probably because the report not only revealed the
inaccuracy of Faubus's claims about impending conflict, but it
also documented the embarrassing contradiction between
Blossom's public statements and private actions regarding the

16. Michael S. Mayer, Eisenhower's Conditional Crusade: The Eisenhower
Administration and Civil Rights, 1953-57 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton U.
1984) (on file in Annex A, Firestone Library, Princeton U.); Mary L. Dudziak, The Little
Rock Crisis andForeignAffairs: Race, Resistance, and the Image ofAmerican Democracy,
70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1641 (1997); Azza Salama Layton, InternationalPressure and the U S.
Government's Response to Little Rock, 56 Ark. Historical Q. 257 (1997).
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same issue, as well as Judge Miller's questionable offer to delay
desegregation. But the government's decision not to use its
conclusive evidence sent a clear message to Faubus: Federal
officials would
enforce desegregation only in extreme
17
circumstances.
The segregationists had continued to heighten tension prior
to September 3, 1957; after their experience in Hoxie, however,
they had avoided a direct clash with federal authority. But
Faubus's withdrawal of the guard and the admission of the Little
Rock Nine to Central created a vacuum in the Arkansas capital,
which the segregationists rushed to fill. The ensuing disturbance
caused the first and only significant break in the government's
cautious policy, when Eisenhower enforced desegregation with
combat troops. Even some defenders of racial justice
condemned this action as heavy handed; consequently, federal
officials returned to their more familiar course of careful
moderation during the rest of the crisis.
Pro-segregationists and the NAACP were the opposite
poles between which local and federal officials struggled. The
die-hard segregationists' hate-filled, racially charged rhetoric,
efforts to arouse class conflict, periodic resort to violence, and
quixotic states-rights appeals had little influence without support
from the mainstream political establishment. For a brief period
in 1958-59 the segregationists had a wider political impact due
to Faubus's states-rights shift, but they never believed that the
governor was sincerely committed to their cause. Their distrust
proved justified when Faubus retreated from an adamant
segregationist stance after the moderates won the special school
board election in the spring of 1959. With this victory,
segregationists again became 8only peripherally significant
despite their continued visibility.'
During the crisis the influence of the NAACP and Little
Rock's divided black community was important but also
17. Freyer, Little Rock Crisis, supra n. 4, at 10 1-07. Regarding the particular matter of
Judge Miller's conduct, see Memo. from Ronald N. Davies, Senior J., U.S. Dist. Ct.
(D.N.D.), to author (Mar. 1980) ("I did not have any idea of Judge Miller's involvement
until reading the FBI report. I considered Judge Miller's actions, as set out in the report, if
true, to be wholly inappropriate and unbecoming a federal judge.") (original on file with
author). On the government's request that Wiley Branton withdraw the suit, see Interview
with Wiley Branton (Dec. 11, 1979) (interview notes on file with author).
18. See generally Alexander, supra n. 10; Jacoway, supran. 10.
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indirect. Until shortly before the confrontation erupted on
September 3, the New York headquarters of the NAACP was
seldom involved with the Little Rock branch. Prior to 1956 the
essentially moderate character of the black community and a
record of interracial cooperation in the city encouraged a
majority of the local NAACP executive committee to favor the
Blossom desegregation plan. Only after the school board revised
its program in favor of tokenism and gradualism did activists
like Daisy Bates and Georg Iggers gain support for a court case.
Although initially unsuccessful, the suit's central purpose of
improving educational opportunity for young blacks fostered
widespread local enthusiasm for the NAACP. Ironically, many
blacks continued to vote for Governor Faubus, even during the
heated third-term gubernatorial campaign of 1958.19 Moreover,
after the federal courts' early rejection of the demand for
progressive integration, the NAACP was reduced to defending
the limited Phase Program in Cooper v. Aaron.
Faubus's role was of course central. During the years
preceding the crisis, not only had he pushed for economic
development and aid to the poor, but also he had specifically
targeted blacks as a group that deserved governmental
assistance. Consequently, Faubus had moved to equalize welfare
benefits and the public spending on education for whites and
blacks. He and other local politicos had won places for blacks on
the state's Democratic Party committees; Arkansas was perhaps
the first state of the Old Confederacy to take this step. Also,
Faubus had not resisted the token desegregation in Northwest
Arkansas schools, and he refused to become embroiled in the
Hoxie struggle.20
During his reelection bid in 1956, Faubus preserved his
credentials as a moderate in contrast with the white supremacist
campaign of his rival, James Johnson. But more complex
political considerations influenced the governor's tilt toward
segregation. Faubus asked the state legislature for the largest tax
19. Arkansas black voters' support for Faubus in the Delta region may be explained by
their domination by planter labor relations; in Little Rock, by contrast, moderate blacks
supported the governor because of his liberal economic policies and his admission, though
limited, of blacks into a few Democratic Party positions. See Freyer, Little Rock Crisis,
supran. 4, at 21-24.
20. Freyer, Little Rock Crisis,supra n. 4, at 96-97 (quoting material about Faubus from
internal NAACP memorandum).
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increase in Arkansas history to address the state's heritage of
retarded growth and developmental backwardness. Arkansas
legislators rejected the taxes. Faubus learned that passage of the
tax package depended upon the support of cotton-growing Delta
counties in East Arkansas, where a majority of the state's blacks
lived. Unlike the extremists who favored overt resistance, Delta
politicos sought to delay compliance with Brown through
exhaustive litigation that tested the validity of intricately
conceived states-rights legislation. After his 1956 reelection,
Faubus and the Delta leadership made a private deal. In the
legislative session of 1957 the governor supported states-rights
legislation sponsored by legislators from East Arkansas (which
had been defeated in 1955) in return for votes favoring increased
taxes. 2 '
Concessions to states-rights legislation entangled Faubus's
political future and his developmental policies in the
desegregation issue. Thus, Faubus had committed himself to
more than an abstract principle: He had tied his political fortunes
to a strategy of delay, testing states-rights laws through repeated
litigation. Through the tense, segregationist-troubled spring and
summer of 1957, Faubus met secretly with school board
representatives, the Justice Department, and even the
segregationists themselves to encourage a court test of the
states-rights measures. The governor hoped that litigation would
result in a federal order like that handed down in Hoxie, which
had brought about desegregation
and halted the segregationists'
22
resistance campaign.
During nearly three weeks of confrontation after September
3, Faubus repeatedly affirmed his willingness to accept a final
court order. The public and secret negotiations with the
Eisenhower administration and its representatives were intended
to make federal officials responsible for enforcing
desegregation, thus removing from Faubus the political stigma
of involvement in the implementation of the Phase Program. As
21. See Freyer, Little Rock Crisis, supra n. 4, at 63-86; Kermit L. Hall, The
ConstitutionalLessons of the Little Rock Crisis, in Understanding the Little Rock Crisis:
An Exercise in Remembrance and Reconciliation 123-40 (Elizabeth Jacoway & C. Fred
Williams eds., U. Ark. Press 1999); Roy Reed, The Contest for the Soul of Orval Faubus,
in Understanding the Little Rock Crisis:An Exercise in Remembrance and Reconciliation
99-106 (Elizabeth Jacoway & C. Fred Williams eds., U. Ark. Press 1999).
22. Freyer, Little Rock Crisis,supra n. 4, at 87-114.
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soon as the federal court specifically ordered him to comply
with federal authority, the governor readily did so. Only after the
Justice Department's failure to use the FBI Report assured him
of the administration's overriding caution, and the enormous
criticism of the use of paratroopers that resulted from the one
significant exception to that policy persuaded him that it would
be politically expedient to do so, did Faubus embrace an
unequivocal segregationist
stance consistent with that of his
23
Johnson.
rival James

In Little Rock the response to Brown demonstrated that
judicial lawmaking could foster public acceptance of
desegregation. But the chief consequence was a confrontation
over the scope, character, and legitimacy of federal authority
that obscured the ideal of equal educational opportunity and
narrowed the reach of the constitutional rule established in
Brown and reaffirmed in Cooper v. Aaron.
A comprehensive report analyzing the Little Rock School
District 24 demonstrated that in 1997 Little Rock community
attitudes and claims of constitutional rights had meaning most
visibly and immediately as ongoing federal-court intervention
and the controversial remedy of busing. The report's survey data
gave a clear picture of the city's public opinion in the mid1990s. Among white households, fifty-six percent supported
"sending my child to a racially integrated school"; African
American households
approved of that statement by a margin of
25
sixty-eight percent.
But interracial popular approval of desegregation in
principle disintegrated when considered in terms of particular
outcomes. The only specific desegregation program a white
majority supported was magnet schools,
26 which fifty-two percent
of whites characterized as effective. African Americans, by
contrast, were divided in their response to this question: "Has
23. Id. at 115-170.
24. Joel E. Anderson et al., Plain Talk : The Future of Little Rock's Public SchoolsUniversity Task Force Report on the Little Rock School District (U. Ark. Little Rock
1997).
25. Id.at 55.
26. Id.at 56. But even though a significant number of white parents express support for
the LRSD's magnet schools, many white children attend private schools. Id at 27
(indicating that nearly fifty percent of the city's white children do not enroll in LRSD
schools).
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desegregation had a positive, negative, or no effect on the
quality of education in the LRSD?" Thirty-three percent
perceived a positive effect, twenty-two percent a negative effect,
twenty-four percent no effect, and twenty-two percent were not
sure. White opinion was more clear-cut: Eighteen percent
replied that desegregation had a positive effect, fourteen percent
saw no effect, and eighteen percent were undecided. The
proportion of whites, however, who perceived a negative effect
was fifty percent.27
Regarding busing as a constitutionally sanctioned tool for
bringing about compliance with federal court desegregation
orders, the difference between the groups' responses was still
more pronounced: Sixty-eight percent of white opinion stated
that cross-town busing was not effective, while only sixteen
percent stated that it was effective. By contrast, forty-three
percent of African American households considered such a
remedy effective. On questions that asked whites and African
Americans whether creating one-race neighborhood elementary,
junior high, and high schools was acceptable, whites approved
of such an outcome by an average seventy-two percent; whereas
African Americans disapproved of such a result by thirty-nine
percent and favored it by forty percent.28
This divided public opinion reflected enormous challenges
facing the LRSD. Security measures were needed to address
discipline and safety concerns. Yet state law that sanctioned an
incongruity between the school district's boundary and the city's
limits contributed to potential bankruptcy. 29 Ultimately,
however, these issues were symptomatic of a fundamental
reality: white flight. A return of between five and eight thousand
white students to the city's public schools would alleviate the
system's financial woes and likely bring unitary status, a level of
racial integration permitting an end to federal judicial
supervision. After forty years, the report urged whites to
understand the alienation African Americans felt as a result of
their history of discrimination; African Americans, it pointed
out, needed in turn to have faith that their children would

27. Id. at 55-56.
28. Id.
29. Id.at 161-67.
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continue to receive material resources from the white taxpaying

majority if federal court intervention ended.30
The Little Rock Nine's courage and determination
continued to inspire faith in the ideal of equal justice. Ernest
Green, the oldest of the Nine, observed that
[t]he thing integration demonstrated is that, as you
challenge the system, it doesn't stop with schools. It
extends to include all other arrangements and relationships.
Once you open Pandora's 31box and let the genie out, you
can't put the genie back in.
In Little Rock the courts and the democratic process

ensured that a more meaningful fulfillment of the nation's
democratic and constitutional ideals would demand greater
commitment and striving. "We're all a work in progress," Melba
Patillo Beals, also of the Nine, has said. "We just have to not
lose faith and keep trying." 32 Here was the enduring lesson of
Little Rock, a lesson America has not yet fully grasped.

30. Id.at 30-41, 64, 67-77.
31. Audrey Edwards & Craig K. Polite, Don't Let Them See You Cry, Parade 10, 13
(Feb. 16, 1992).
32. Assoc. Press, Desegregation a "Work in Progress" Tuscaloosa News 3B (Aug. 10,
1997).

